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THE INTERSECTION OF
SOCIOECONOMIC CLASS AND GENDER
IN HOSTILE HOUSING ENVIRONMENT
CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VIII: WHO IS
THE REASONABLE PERSON?
DEB° RA H ZA ',ESN E *
Sexual Harassment, most broadly defined, refers to the unwanted
imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship
of unequal power.'
—Catharine A. MacKinnon
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces
of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may
blow through it; the storm may enter; but the King of England may
not enter; all his force dare not cross the threshold of the ruined
tenement.'
—William Pitt the Elder
Sexual harassment is predicated on the imbalance of power. Land-
lords typically have significant power over their tenants, including the
power to choose a tenant, to evict a tenant, to provide or withhold
services, and to set the rent. Landlords have additional power because
of the historical allocation of property in this society and widespread
shortages of adequate rental housing in America's urban areas. 3
The housing crisis in our nation's cities most seriously affects
low-income Americans. During the past few decades, median monthly
* Assistant Professor, CUNY School of Law. B.A. 1988, Williams College; ,(.D. 1992, University
of Denver College of Law; L.L.M. 1992, Temple University School of Law. I would like to thank
the participants in the Temple Law School Faculty Colloquium for their insightful comments and
suggestions on an earlier draft. I am especially grateful to Marina Angel, Jane Baron, Nancy
Ehrenreich, Joanne Epps, Rick Greenstein, Nancy Knauer, Donald Price and Adrien Wing for
their thoughtful and intelligent comments and for their support and encouragement. I would
also like to thank my Temple Law School research assistants, William Kovatch and Michael Hayes,
who provided invaluable help with research and organization.
I CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION 1 (1979).
2 William Pitt the Elder, Address before the House of Commons in 1766 (quoted in NELsoN
B. LASSON, THE -limn -my AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 01."I'LIE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 49-50 (1970)).
3 See infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
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rental rates have increased more than double the rate of salary growth
over the same period.4 Consequently, "poor families today . . . [have]
never had a harder time trying to find a decent place to live."5 Poor
tenants, as a result, are often in subordinate positions with respect
to their landlords. Socialized norms further subordinate low-income
women, who comprise the majority of tenants victimized by sexual
harassment.° An unequal power relationship involving a dominant
male landlord thus provides an environment for sexual harassment of
women.
Rental housing sexual harassment is particularly invasive because
it violates the sanctity of the home: 'The woman sexually harassed at
work can go home to find peace and safety; the woman harassed by
her landlord has no such safe haven. Sexually harassed tenants must
be continually watchful; indeed, some women completely alter their
living patterns to avoid contact with the harasser." 7
In some jurisdictions, 8 women who are sexually harassed by their
landlords can now seek recourse through Title VIII of the Civil Rights
Act, commonly known as the Federal Fair Housing Act ("Title VIII" or
the "Fair Housing Act" or the "Act"). 8 The Fair Housing Act makes it
unlawful to discriminate in the sale or rental of a dwelling on the basis
of sex. 1 ° Courts interpreting the Fair Housing Act have held that sexual
harassment of tenants by landlords constitutes gender discrimination."
The United States Supreme Court, however, has yet to rule on the
question.
The few courts that have addressed the issue of landlord sexual
harassment have not agreed on a standard for determining whether
4 See Barbara Vobejcia, Low-Income Housing Crisis is Escalating, HUI) Reports, WASH. POST,
Mar. 15, 1996, at A27; see also infra note 137.
Vobejda, supra note 4, at A27 (quoting Bob Adams, president of the National Low-Income
Housing Coalition).
6
 See infra note 146.
7 William Litt et al., Sexual Harassment Hits Home, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S LI 227, 234 (1992)
(quoting Kathleen Boiler, Sexual Harassment in Rental Housing, 1989 U. hi.. L. REv. 175, 181
(1989)).
8 See infra notes 42-45.
On April 11, 1968, Congress passed the Fair Housing Act of 1968. § 810, 82 Stat. 81, 85
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1994 & Supp.)). Congress passed the Fair Housing Amend-
ments Act of 1988 on September 13, 1988. 102 Stat. 1619 (codified as amended at scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.),
1 ° See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1994).
" See, e.g., Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F. Supp. 1393, 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Abrams v. Merlino,
694 F. Stipp. 1101, 1104 (S,D.N.Y. 1988); Grieger v. Sheets, 689 F. Supp. 835 (N.D. III. 1988);
Shcllhammer v. Lewallen, I Fair Housing-Fair Lending Cases 1 15,472, at 1 16,139 (W.D. Ohio
Nov. 22, 1983); Gnerre v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 524 N.E.2d 84 (Mass.
1988); Chomicki v, Wittekind, 381 N.W.2d 561 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985).
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a landlord's conduct constitutes sexual harassment. 12 In a majority
of rental sexual harassment cases, the victims are women.' 3 In other
causes of action typically involving women victims, such as hostile work
environment claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title
VII") 14 or claims of domestic violence or rape, there has been vigorous
debate about which standard courts should apply to evaluate the of-
fensive conduct. 15 Although the reasonable person standard remains
the majority rule, many courts and commentators suggest that where
the majority of victims are women, determinations of whether conduct
constitutes sexual harassment should be made from the perspective of
the reasonable woman."' Because of a continuing split in the federal
12 See infra notes 94-101. Since 1983, when the Shellhammer court first addressed the issue,
many scholars have discussed whether landlord sexual harassment is gender discrimination under
Title VIII. See, e.g., Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor
Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, '20 HOESTRA L. REV. 533 (1992); Nancy Blodgett, Lusting Land-
lords: More Women Tenants Suing, 73 A.B.A.j. 30 (1987); Susan Etta Keller, Does the Roof Have to
Cave in? The Landlord/Tenant Power Relationship and the Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1663 (1988); Litt, supra note 7; Regina Callan, Comment, Home is
No Haven: An Analysis of Sexual Harassment in Housing, 1987 Wis. L. Rev. 1061; Robert Rosen-
thal, Comment, Landlord Sexual Harassment: A Federal Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 589 (1992). Few,
however, have reached the issue ()I' the standard that should be applied, assuming a tenant did
have a cause of action.
11 See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
14 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) ( I ).
15 The debate focuses primarily on the reasonable person standard, which considers conduct
from the perspective of the hypothetical average person, and the reasonable woman standard,
which evaluates behavior from the perspective of a typical woman—a woman who reacts differ-
ently to situations than most men, but who, at the same time, is neither hypersensitive nor
idiosyncratic. See generally Mary Ruffolo Rauch, Rape—From a Woman's Perspective, 82 ILL. N.
614, 618 (1994) (addressing standard in rape claims); Lynn Dennison, Note, An Argument for the
Reasonable Woman Standard in Hostile Environment Claims, 54 Onus ST. L.J. 473 (1993) (address-
ing standard in hostile work environment claims); Steffani J. Saitow, Note, Battered Woman
Syndrome: Does the "Reasonable Battered Woman" Exist?, 19 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINE-
MENT 329 (1993) (addressing standard itt domestic violence claims). These three different fbrins
of violence against women have been linked because "each symbolizes different forms of women's
subordinated status." Naomi K. Calm, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman
Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 Co 'mut, L. REv. 1398, 1400 (1992).
Some courts and commentators have advocated different variations of the reasonable person
standard, including the reasonable victim standard, see, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 593 n.33
(citing articles), and the reasonable battered woman standard, see, e.g., Martha Chamallas,
Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual and Racial Harassment Litiga-
tion, I l'Ex. J. WOMEN & L. 95, 129 (1992). One court recommended judging behavior from the
perspectives of both the perpetrator and the victim. See Lipseu v. University of RR., 864 17,2d 881,
898 (1st Cir. 1988). Finally, some commentators have suggested abandoning reasonableness
altogether. See, e.g., Nancy S. Ehre.nrcich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of
Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177 (1990).
15 See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-81 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying reasonable woman
standard to a claim of hostile work environment); State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 558-59 (Wash.
1977) (in a case involving a murder charge against. a woman who shot and killed a man suspected
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circuits on this issue in the employment context, judicial opinions, like
scholarship, offer little guidance to courts addressing landlord sexual
harassment and will probably not push the Supreme Court in any one
direction when it is finally called upon to determine the standard in
the housing context.
Neither the reasonable person nor the reasonable woman stand-
ard has been completely effective in sexual harassment claims under
Title VII. Despite the importance of the debate, scholars have been
unable to reach a consensus. Many commentators believe the seem-
ingly neutral reasonable person standard actually reflects the male
point of view. 17
 They believe the reasonable woman standard must be
applied to take into account the female perspective. Others, however,
suggest that the reasonable woman standard is inherently biased in
favor of the victim and difficult to apply."'
The problems associated with the reasonableness standards are
especially clear in Title VIII sexual harassment claims. The reasonable
person standard views the world from the eyes of the middle-class,
white male, a person often equated with power. The typical victim of
landlord sexual harassment, however, is a poor, minority, and often
powerless woman."' The reasonable woman standard attempts to ac-
count for the woman's perspective but results in the false assumption
that there is an "essential" woman. This assumption fails to account for
differences among women. 2° Essentializing women is especially prob-
lematic in housing sexual harassment cases for two reasons. First, in
addition to the problem of subordination of women by men, rental
housing sexual harassment typically involves exploitation of poor peo-
ple by those in positions of economic power. Second, a disproportion-
ate number of victims of housing sexual harassment are minorities.
Since poor women may face a different type of subordination than
wealthy women, and because subordination is often different for mi-
nority women altogether, sweeping application of the reasonable
woman standard to women of all socioeconomic classes and races
would be too broad.
of child molestation, the court applied a reasonable woman standard to determine if the woman
shot him in self defense); Rauch, supra note 15, at 618 ("A subjective reasonable woman standard
should apply to the question of whether force was used in a particular rape case."); Dennison,
supra note 15 (reasonable woman standard should apply in claims of hostile work environment);
Saitow, supra note 15, at 356 ("The [reasonable woman] standard is essential [in a case in which
a battered woman has killed] to explain the defendant's belief that serious harm was imminent.").
17 See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
18 See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
IS See infra notes 143--46.
i See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
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A tempting solution is to create a different standard for various
groups with different experiences and perspectives. For example, if the
victim is a poor black woman, the "reasonable low-income black
woman" standard would apply. Under that approach, however, the
standard would continue to decompose until it became completely
individualized. Furthermore, courts would be forced to categorize in-
dividuals according to factors such as class, gender and ethnic make-
up; specific characteristics would be applied to each group, thereby
perpetuating existing stereotypes.
As long as the jurisprudence remains trapped in this circular
debate between the reasonable person and reasonable woman stand-
ards, courts will never focus on the real problem associated with sexual
harassment—power. Sexual harassment occurs when one person is in
a position of power with respect to the other. Because of the historical
allocation of propere and the scarcity of adequate rental housing, 22
landlords usually have some power over their tenants. When com-
pounded with the fact that tenants are often poor minority women who
are socially, politically and economically powerless, the power imbal-
ance is complicated. The reasonableness standards are not designed
to take specifically into account the unique power disparities often seen
in the landlord-tenant relationship. This Article proposes that in claims
of hostile housing environment under Title VIII, courts shift their
focus from the perceptions of the victim, where they are forced to
indulge in debate regarding the inherent differences between men
and women or between poor people and rich people, to the conduct
of the alleged harasser and the unequal balance of power that underlie
the very construction of the landlord-tenant relationship.
Part I provides a background of the evolving law regarding hos-
tile housing environment claims. It examines the "reasonable person"
standard derived from judicial analysis in most hostile work environ-
ment claims under Title VII and the "reasonable woman" standard
advocated by many commentators. Part ll explores the limitations of
both standards in the housing context and urges courts to abandon
"reasonableness" as a paradigm completely. Part III evaluates the power
imbalance that often exists between landlords and tenants.
This Article ultimately proposes a standard that focuses on the
conduct of the harasser and on the distribution of power between the
landlord and tenant, rather than the perceptions of the victim. I
suggest shifting that focus in a two-step analysis. First, the court must
21 See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
22 See infra note 137.
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evaluate the behavior of the alleged harasser, the landlord. Regardless
of who the tenant is and what the tenant perceives, certain conduct by
the landlord should constitute per se harassment. Second, the court
must evaluate the relationship between the landlord and the tenant.
Even if the conduct is not considered sexual harassment in all circum-
stances, it might still violate the Act if there is a significant disparity in
power between the two parties. To analyze the power disparity, the
court must first identify the power matrix between the parties, consid-
ering such factors as the gender, race and economic status of both the
landlord and tenant, the housing market, and any other factors which
contribute to an imbalance of power in the specific case at hand. The
court must then determine whether the landlord has exploited his
power over the tenant in an impermissible way.
Under this schematic, the court will not be forced to draw conclu-
sions about membership in a particular group. It will not be necessary,
for example, to assume that all women need protection or that all
whites are empowered. Historical power imbalances between classes,
races and other groups will become relevant, but not defining. Rather
than asking whether the victim was reasonable in perceiving the defen-
dant's conduct as harassing, the court will focus its inquiry on whether
the defendant's conduct was proper in light of the power he exercised
over the victim.
I. HOSTILE LIVING ENVIRONMENT CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VIII
A. Background
Sexual harassment by landlords" can take many different forms,
such as unwanted sexual innuendos or physical advances, or the con-
ditioning of rights of tenancy on sexual favors. Landlords, by the terms
of most leases, maintain legal access to their tenants' apartments."
Although under those leases landlords are restricted to entry at rea-
sonable times with the tenants' permission, many tenants still live with
the fear that their landlords will enter without notice. 25 Often, victims
fear taking legal action because they believe that if they do, they may
not only lose the lawsuit, but their homes as well. Many of these tenants
23
 Since a large majority of victims of housing sexual harassment are women, see infra note
143, sexual harassment discussed in the abstract will refer to male landlords harassing female
tenants, unless otherwise specified.
24
 Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 592.
25 See id. (citing Gnerre v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 524 N.E.2d 84, 87
(Mass. 198H)).
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become resigned to the fact their landlords will exploit their economic
vulnerability by sexually harassing them. In several jurisdictions, how-
ever, these women can now seek recourse through the Fair Housing
Act.
Title VIII of the Federal Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful "[t]o
discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges
of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities
in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial
status, or national origin." 26 The Act does not, however, explicitly pro-
hibit landlord sexual harassment of tenants.
Courts hearing Title VIII cases have drawn analogies to the similar
provision in Title VII. 27 The language of the two statutes is virtually
identical, as Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating "against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex." 2'judi-
cial interpretations of Title VIII have closely paralleled decisions inter-
preting Title VII racial discrimination. 29 Although courts have explicitly
held that sexual harassment is prohibited under Title VII as impermis-
sible gender discrimination," until recently courts interpreting Title
VIII did not follow suit.
In 1983, the District Court for the Western District of Ohio recog-
nized for the first time that sexual harassment in the context of rental
housing constitutes sex discrimination under Title VIII. 3 ' In Shellham-
mer v. Lewallen, the court liberally construed the Fair Housing Act,
holding that Congress intended to prohibit discrimination, broadly
defined, in the terms, conditions or privileges of a tenancy. 32
 The
federal and state courts that have heard cases involving landlord sexual
26 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1994).
27 See infra notes 29 and 44.
28 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1).
29 See, e.g., Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F,2d 926, 934 (2d Cir.
1988); Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 P2d 1032, 1037-38 (2d Cir. 1979).
25 See Monitor Say. Bank v, Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986), Confining itself to the words
of the statute, the Court stated that by the phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment," Congress intended "to strike at the entire spectrum or disparate treatment of men and
women." Id. at 64.
81 See Shellharnmer v. Lewallen, 1 Fair Housing-Pair Lending Cases 15,472 (W,D. Ohio Nov.
22, 1983). In this landmark case, Thomas and Tammy Shellhammer claimed that their landlord,
Norman Lewallen, had sexually harassed Tammy by asking her to pose for nude pictures and to
have sex with him. See id. at 135. Lewallen ultimately evicted the couple in what he claimed was
a dispute over who should buy a new refrigerator. See id. at 137-38. The court held that the
Shellhammers' cause of action was viable under the Fair Housing Act but found that they were
unable to show that the harassment created an offensive or hostile environment. Id. at 137.
32 Id. at 135-36,
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harassment since Shellhammer have agreed that Title VII sexual harass-
ment principles should govern Title VIII litigation. 33
Victims of landlord sexual harassment are often reluctant to re-
port the harassment for fear of retaliation." Retaliation in the housing
context can present a serious risk to a tenant, since a landlord has the
power to evict a tenant who refuses his sexual advances or to force the
tenant to live in a substandard environment. Because of the widespread
shortage of low-income housing, eviction can have particularly severe
consequences for the poor, including homelessness. 35 Landlords who
harass can make it even more difficult for women who report sexual
harassment by blacklisting them, thereby preventing them from getting
other low-income housing. 36
 Instead of eviction, the landlord may also
refuse to make repairs, enforce rules more rigidly or charge higher
rent." In addition, landlords frequently threaten violence toward the
tenant or her family. 38
 These threats of retaliation often cause victims
to suffer sexual harassment in silence.
Because cases involving hostile housing environment are often
unreported, lawsuits premised on sexual harassment in rental housing
are scarce.39
 The United States Supreme Court has never addressed
whether there is a cause of action for sexual harassment under Title
VIII. Until recently, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit was the
only circuit court to have recognized such a cause of action, and only
tentatively. 4° In September 1996, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
33 See infra notes 43-49.
34 For example, in United Stales v. Presidio Investments, Ltd., after the tenant filed a complaint
against her landlord, the landlord retaliated against her by, among other things, demanding entry
into her apartment and threatening eviction if she did not comply. 4 F.3d 805,806 (9th Cir. 1993).
The landlord refused to activate her air conditioning and turned off the pilot light to her hot
water heater. See id. Other deterrents to reporting sexual harassment include "silence as the
preferred method of coping, aversion to the perceived stigma attached to victims of sexual
harassment, the tendency of some victims to blame themselves for the harassment, anticipation
of ridicule, and the desire to avoid further suffering." Litt, supra note 7, at 232.
35 See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
36 See Litt, supra note 7, at 232.
37 See Callan, supra note 12, at 1067.
" See Litt, supra note 7, at 233.
39 See id. at 230 ("Victimized tenants rarely report instances of harassment by landlords or
building managers, resulting in few rental housing sexual harassment lawsuits."); Cahan, supra
note 12, at 1066 (after surveying 150 Fair Housing Agencies, Cahan concluded: 'Taking into
account the various reasons women are reluctant to report their harassment, it is likely the actual
incidents of sexual harassment in housing number more than the 288 reported.").
For example, the American Bar Association reported that according to Sharma Smith, the
director of Toledo's Fair Housing Center at the time the Shellhammers filed their claim of sexual
harassment against Lewallen, twenty-seven other women in Lewallen's buildings admitted to
being sexually harassed by him. See Blodgett, supra note 12, at 30. The other women were all on
welfare, and none of them filed their own claims. See id.
49 See Nonce v. Vigil, I F.3d 1085 (10th Cir. 1993). In nonce, a woman who rented a lot in a
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Circuit joined the Tenth Circuit in recognizing a hostile housing envi-
ronment cause of action,'" Fewer than ten cases alleging sexual harass-
ment in violation of Title VIII have been reported in federal district
courts42 and only a handful of additional cases allege violations of state
fair housing statutes."
B. Current Standard for Determining Sexual Harassment
In evaluating claims of sexual harassment in rental housing, courts
have relied on the definitions and theories of sexual harassment de-
veloped in the employment context. 44 As in Title VII employment cases,
there are two types of sexual harassment claims under Title VIII, the
"quid pro quo" claim and the "hostile environment" claim.° Quid pro
mobile home park sued her landlord for sexual harassment under the Fair Housing Act. Id. at.
1087. The landlord asked the tenant to accompany him socially on three occasions. See Id. When
she ultimately responded that she did not wish to go out with him at any time, he never asked
her out again. See id. The offensive behavior did not include sexual remarks or requests, physical
touching or threats of violence. See id. After the tenant moved in, she and the landlord had a
series of disputes over the property, which the tenant attributed to sexual harassment. See id. at
1087-88.
The Tenth Circuit held that a hostile housing environment claim is actionable under Title
VIII when "the offensive behavior unreasonably interferes with use and enjoyment of the prem-
ises" and is "sufficiently severe or pervasive" to alter the conditions of the housing arrangement.
Id. at 1090. In that case, however, because the landlord's conduct was neither sexual nor directed
solely at women, the court held it was not actionable under the hostile housing environment
theory. Id.
41 See DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3(1 1004 (7th Cir. 1996). In DiCenco, on one occasion, the
landlord "began caressing [the tenant's] arm and back," intimated that if she could not pay the
rent she could take care of it "in other ways," and when she asked to leave, he called her names
such as "bitch" and "whore." Id. at 1006. The Seventh Circuit held that a one-time proposition
for sex unaccompanied by sufficiently egregious touching was insufficient to prove a hostile
housing environment under the Fair Housing Act. Id. at 1009. The court noted that "DiCenso's
comment vaguely invited Brown to exchange sex for rent, and while Dicenso caressed Brown's
arm and back, he did not touch an intimate body part, and did not threaten Brown with any
physical harm." Id. About the landlord's conduct, the court stated "while clearly unwelcome, [it]
was much less offensive than other incidents which have not violated Title VII." Id. at 1008-09.
42 See Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F. Supp. 1393 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Doe v. Maywood lions. Auth.,
No. 93C 2865, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9020 (N.D. I11. June 25, 1993); Bethishou v. Ridgeland
Apartments, No. 88C 5256, 1989 WL 122434 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 2, 1989); Abrams v. Merlin°, 694 F.
Stipp. 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Crieger v. Sheets, 689 F. Supp. 835 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Shellhammer v.
Lewallen, 1 Fair Housing-Fair Lending Cases 1 15,472 (W.D. Ohio Nov. 22, 1983).
43 See, e.g., Gncrie v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 524 N.E.2d 84 (Mass.
1988); Chomicki v. Wittekind, 381 N.W.2d 561 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985).
44 See, e.g., Shellhammer, 1 Fair Housing-Fair Lending Cases at, 16,135 (citing Henson v, City
of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11ill Cir. 1982)). The workplace sexual harassment cases in turn have
relied on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") Title VII Guidelines. See,
e.g., Henson, 682 F.2d at 903 (citing EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1981) (defining sexual
harassment as quThwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature")).
45 See generally Shellhammer, I Fair Housing-Fair Lending Cases at 1 15,472.
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quo sexual harassment occurs when "the landlord either conditions
any of the terms, conditions or privileges of tenancy on submission to
his sexual request or deprives the tenant of any of those terms, condi-
tions or privileges because the tenant has refused to accede to his
requests."4" Conduct constitutes hostile environment sexual harass-
ment if it "unreasonably interferes with use and enjoyment of the
premises"47
 or it "makes continued tenancy burdensome and signifi-
cantly less desirable than if the harassment were not occurring. "48
Courts have struggled with the standard for determining when
tenancy becomes burdensome and significantly less desirable. In both
the employment and the housing contexts, courts have been split as
to whether to make that determination from the perspective of the
reasonable person or the reasonable woman. 40
 In the employment
context, most courts have analyzed the claim of sexual harassment
under the reasonable person standard. 5° Those courts have found
sexual harassment if a "reasonable person" would have found the work
environment burdensome and significantly less desirable. 51
 They rea-
soned that if a reasonable woman standard were used, "a claim [would]
be predicated on the sensitivities and perceptions of the particular
claimant. Thus, society [would] not have one uniform standard on
which to base its conduct.""
Several circuit courts, however, have applied the reasonable
woman standard, asserting that the so-called neutral reasonable person
standard actually contains unstated assumptions that are male-based."
413 Griegerl 1989 WL 38707, at *2 (citing Shellhammer, 1 Fair Housing-Fair Lending Cases at
1 16,129); see EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1)—(2) (1996) (describing quid pro quo
sexual harassment as occurring when "submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or
implicitly a term or condition ()fan individual's employment ... [and] submission to or rejection
of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such
47 See Nonce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1090 (10th Cir. 1993).
48
 ShellhaMMer, 1 Fair Housing-Fair Lending Cases at 1 16,128 (plaintiff its a hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment suit must show: (1) membership in a protected group; (2) unwelcome
and extensive sexual harassment that the plaintiff finds undesirable or offensive; (3) that the
harassment was based on sex; and (4) that the "harassment makes continued tenancy burdensome
and significantly less desirable than if the harassment were not occurring") (citing EEOC Guide-
lines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (defining hostile environment sexual harassment as "such con-
duct [that] has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment")).
49 See generally info notes 50, 53, 94 and 100.
50 See generally Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 594 n.40 (citing cases).
51 See id.
52 M. at 594; see, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) ("trier
of fact ... must adopt the perspective of a reasonable person's reaction to a similar environ-
ment"), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
53 See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); Andrews v. City of Phila., 895
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In cases involving violence against women, the reasonable woman
standard serves to change the woman's subordinated status by "in-
creasfingi the potential for effective enforcement of laws against sub-
ordinating behavior."54 Specifically, the reasonable woman standard
includes women's experiences "in a system with asymmetrical power
relations that has historically excluded women's participation."'
Studies show that because women have not historically held power
positions,'" men and women often have different perspectives regard-
ing what conduct constitutes sexual harassment. 57 According to a joint
survey by Redbook magazine and the Harvard Business Review on sexual
harassment in the workplace, "[m]ost people agree on what harass-
ment is. But men and women disagree strongly on how frequently it
occurs."58 The study showed that actions deemed harassment by
women were often perceived as harmless by men. 59 The report con-
cluded that "[f]rom the comments in the returns, a visitor from an-
other planet might conclude that men and women work in separate
F.2d 1469, 1482-83 (3rd Cir. 1990) (utilizing "minority employee" standard); Yates v, Avco Corp.,
819 F.2(1 630, 636-37 (6th Cir. 1987), See also Stingley v. Arizona, 796 F. Sun.), 424, 429 (D. Ariz.
1992) (utilizing the "reasonable person of the same gender and race or color standard); Harris
v. International Paper Co., 765 E Stipp. 1509, 1516 n.12 (D. Me. 1991), vacated in part, 765 F.
Stipp. 1529 (D. Me. 1991) (utilizing the "reasonable person from the protected group of which
the alleged victim is a member" standard). In addition, many commentators argue that the
definition of harassment should lake into account the perceptions of the particular victim;
Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 593 n.33 (citing articles).
54 Cahn, supra note l5, at 1400.
55 Id. at 1401.
56 See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
57 See Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 593. For example, in a study by the New York Task Force
on Women in the Courts, 16% of women but only 3% of men believed that judges subjected
women attorneys to unwanted verbal or physical sexual advances. See Marina Angel, Sexual
Harassment b yjudge5, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 817, 833 (1991) (citing New York Task Force on Women
in the Courts Report (1986), reprinted in 15 Founuma URB. Li. 11 (1986-87)). Conversely, 82%
of men, but only 47% of women, believed it never happened. See id. at 833-34.
5H Eliza G.C. Collins & Timothy B. Blodgett, Sexual Harassment ... Some See it . . Some
Won't, HAay. Bus. REV., Man—Apr. 1981, at 76, 77; see also Sally A. Piefer, Comment, Sexual
Harassment from the Victim's Perspective; The Need for the Seventh Circuit to Adopt the Reasonable
Woman Standard, 77 MAN. L. Ray. 85, 86 (1 993).
59 For example, nearly two-thirds of the 'nets, compared with about half of' the women
surveyed, agree with the statement, "the amount of sexual harassment at work is greatly exagger-
ated." See id, at 78. One-third of the men surveyed, compared to a full half of the women, had
witnessed or heard of a case where a roan starts each (lay with a sexual remark that he insists is
a social comment. See id. at 82. In the situation where a man eyes a woman up and down, 24%
percent of all women, compared with 8% of all men, think it is harassment. See id. at 81.
Conversely, in reaction to a scenario where a man kisses a woman co-worker every time they
meet, more men than women, proportionately, rated the action objectionable. See id. Likewise,
where the man offers to drive the woman home and where the married man and the woman
have dinner together and go to a nightclub while on a business trip, more men than women also
thought those incidents were possibly harassment. See id.
872	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 38:861
organizations."6° The reasonable person standard fails to reflect
women's perceptions of what constitutes sexual harassment.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was the first to apply
the reasonable woman standard in a Title VII sexual harassment case. 6 '
In Ellison v. Brady, the court held that under the reasonable woman
standard, "a female plaintiff states a prima facie case of hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment when she alleges conduct which a reason-
able woman would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of employment and create an abusive working environ-
men t.''2 The Ellison court adopted the "perspective of a reasonable
woman primarily because . . . a sex-blind reasonable person standard
tends to be male-biased and tends to systematically ignore the experi-
ences of women."6s Recognizing the value of maintaining an objective
standard,''' the court reasoned that it was more appropriate to analyze
the harassment from the viewpoint of a reasonable victim because
women will be protected from actions that are acceptable to men but
which offend reasonable women.''' Following Ellison, several other
courts have applied the reasonable woman standard. 66
Some courts and commentators have criticized the reasonable
woman standard as unfair to the accused and difficult for the trier of
fact to administer. 67
 Critics assert that courts should act as an unbiased
and disinterested forum—by taking the perspective of the victim or
reasonable woman, they suggest, the court inevitably takes a side. 68 In
66 See id.
61 See. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991).
62 Id. at 879.
l Id.
64
 Other courts have added a subjective component to the test requiring a plaintiff w show
that the discrimination adversely affected her. See, e.g., Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480-81, 1482-83.
65 Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878. Likewise, in a dissent in Rabidue, Judge Keith picked up on the
idea that there is no homogeneous consensus in society regarding appropriate behavior toward
the opposite sex. 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting). Accordingly, claiming the court's suppos-
edly neutral analysis actually gave the male perspective, Judge Keith argued that the reasonable
woman standard would have been more appropriate. See id. (Keith, J., dissenting).
66
 See supra note 53.
67 See, e.g., Fowler v. Kootenai County, 918 P.2d 1185, 1189 (Idaho 1996); Radtke v. Everett,
501 N.W.2c1 155, 165-66 (Mich. 1993); Garcia v. Andrews, 867 S.W.2d 409, 412 (Tex. Ct. App.
1993); Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Pierce, The Legal, Ethical, and Social Implications of the
"Reasonable Woman" Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 61 FORUHAM L. RE.v. 773 (1993); Paul
B. Johnson, The Reasonable Woman Standard in Sexual Harassment Law: Progress or Illusion?, 28
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 619, 626 (1993); Walter Christopher Arbery, Note, A Step Backward for
Equality Principles: The 'Reasonable Woman" Standard in Title VII Hostile Work Environment Sexual
Harassment Claims, 27 GA. L. REv. 503 (1993); Robert Unikel, Comment, "Reasonable" Doubts: A
Critique of the Reasonable Woman Standard in American Jurisprudence, 87 Nw. U. 1. REv. 326
(1992).
Seejohnson, supra note 67, at 639-40.
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addition, authorities have alleged that it is not fair to hold a man to a
standard that he cannot understand. 69 These authorities reason that
under the reasonable woman standard, innocent men will be legally
liable for behavior that unintentionally offends a woman."
Finally, it would be difficult for a male judge or jury member to
accurately understand the female viewpoint. A male trier of fact apply-
ing the reasonable woman standard will necessarily resort to gender
stereotyping. 7 ' The reasonable woman standard assumes that the point
of view of a woman is alien to men. 72 Yet, after making this assumption,
it requires men who are not expected to understand the woman's
perspective to apply the standard." Opponents of the reasonable
woman standard thus consider it antithetical to the sex-blind principle
of Title VII. 74
In 1993, without specifically rejecting the reasonable woman stan-
dard, the United States Supreme Court applied the reasonable person
standard in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.Th Although the lower courts
had applied the reasonable woman standard," the Supreme Court did
not directly address the debate." The Court held simply that abusive
work environment sexual harassment requires no concrete psychologi-
cal harm to the victim—it need only be so severe or pervasive that a
"reasonable person" would find it, and the plaintiff did find it, hostile
or abusive." The standard of review issue was not fully litigated, how-
ever, because the parties agreed that "unwelcome workplace conduct
6• See Adler & Pierce, supra note 67, at 825-26.
70 See id.
71 See Unikel, supra note 67, at. 367.
7'2 See Johnson, supra note 67, at 635.
73 See id. at 642.
74 See Arbery, supra note 67, at 506.
75 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). This case involved a claim of sexual harassment by a woman
manager of an equipment rental company whose president insulted her with comments in front
of others such as, "You're a woman, what do you know?" Id. at 19. The president also subjected
her to unwanted sexual innuendos, such as suggesting in jest that they negotiate her raise in a
motel room. Id,
"The district court found that "a reasonable woman manager under like circumstances
would have been offended by Hardy, but his conduct would not have risen to the level of
interfering with that person's work performance." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., No. 3:89-0557, 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20115, at *17 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 28, 1990). The court of appeals affirmed the
district court's opinion in an unpublished decision. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 976 F.2d 733, 733
(6th Cir. 1992).
77 The Supreme Court granted certiorari solely on the issue of whether conduct must
"seriously affect [an employee's] psychological well-being" to be considered sexual harassment.
Harris, 510 U.S. at 20.
" Id. al 21-22, The Court explained that sexual harassment claims should be evaluated with
a two-prong lest. Id, First, a court should consider whether a reasonable person would find the
conduct offensive. See id. at 21. 11' so, the court must then determine whether the particular
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should be considered from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the
position of the plaintiff." 79
Despite the Court's ruling in Harris, several circuit courts have
continued to apply the reasonable woman standard. For example, in
Hixson v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.,8° the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that a constructive discharge due to sexual harass-
ment occurs if "working conditions are so difficult or unpleasant that
a reasonable woman in the employee's shoes would feel compelled to
resign. "81 Likewise, in Mullins v. Campbell Soup Co.,82 the Ninth Circuit
relied upon Ellison in holding that conduct constituted sexual harass-
ment if "a reasonable woman in Mullins' position would find her su-
pervisor's conduct 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condi-
tions of employment and create an abusive working environment.'' 8s
These courts cited Harris for its primary holding that to create a hostile
work environment, conduct need not seriously affect an employee's
psychological well-being,84 but failed to consider the Harris case as
precedent for the reasonable person standard. Other courts, however,
have interpreted Harris as mandating the reasonable person stand-
ard. 85
In Fuller v. City of Oakland," the Ninth Circuit took an interesting
approach. The court cited Harris for the proposition that under a
hostile work environment theory, the working environment must "both
subjectively and objectively be perceived as abusive."87 The court then
added, however, that whether the workplace is objectively hostile must
be determined "from the perspective of a reasonable person with the
same fundamental characteristics." 8B Because the victim in that case was
a woman, the court adopted the reasonable woman standard, basing
its determination on whether "a reasonable woman would ... find the
plaintiff actually found the behavior offensive. See id. at 21-22. Thus, there is an objective and a
subjective component to the test. See id.
79 Reply Brief of Petitioner at 9 0.4, Harris, 510 U.S. at 17 (Nu. 92-1168).
"No. 94-5832, 1996 U.S. App, LEXIS 15421 (6th Cir. )tine 10, 1996).
HI Id. at *15 (citing Yates v. Avco Corp,, 819 F.2d 630, 636 (6th Cir. 1987)).
" No. 93-56492, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 11918 (9th Cir. May 18, 1995).
85 Id. at *12 (quoting Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991)); see Steiner v.
Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3(1 1459, 1462-63 (9th Cir. 1994).
84 See. Hixson, 1996 U.S. App, LEXIS 15421, at *11 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 21); Mullins,
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 11918, at *11 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 22).
85 See, e.g., Bunch v. Shalala, No. 94-2269, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 27275, at *25 (4th Cir. Sept.
25, 1995); DeAngelis v. El Paso Mum Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 594 (5th Cir. 1995).
86
 47 F.3(1 1523 (9th Cir. 1995).
57 1d. at 1527 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22).
88 id. (citing Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879) (emphasis added).
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incidents . . . sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter her work envi-
ronmen t. " 89
The Seventh Circuit held similarly in Dey v. Colt Construction &
Development Co.,"stating: "[w] e thus consider not only the actual effect
of the harasser's conduct on his victim, but also the effect similar
conduct would have had on a reasonable person in the plaintiff's
position." The court then adopted the EEOC's Guidelines on Dis-
crimination Because of Sex, 92 which defined the reasonable person
standard as including "consideration of the perspective of persons of
the alleged victim's race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age
or disability."
Some courts reconcile Harris and Ellison by defining the reason-
able person standard to include such characteristics as gender, while
others simply cite Harris as authority for the reasonable person stand-
ard. The debate thus remains exactly where it was prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Harris.
In the landlord-tenant context, the few courts addressing the issue
have likewise disagreed on a standard. Notably, the lower courts hear-
ing landlord-tenant sexual harassment cases have not consistently
adopted the reasonable person standard derived from Harris. At least
two courts have taken the view that the definition of sexual harassment
should take into account the perceptions of the particular victim." In
Shellhammer v. Lewallen, the court held that the perspective of the
tenant was relevant in analyzing whether the landlord sexually harassed
the tenant.95 The court reasoned that the tenancy was personal to the
tenant, hence the tenant's reaction to the landlord's conduct was
probative of whether the landlord harassed her." The court specifi-
cally rejected the reasonable person standard." Likewise, in Beliveau v.
Caras," decided after Harris, the United States District Court for the
Central District of California applied the reasonable woman standard
1114 Id. at 1528.
9" 28 F.3d. 1446 (7th Cir. 1994).
91 Id. at 1454.
92 See 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266, 51,269 (1993) (proposed 29 C.F.R. § 1609.1(c), withdrawn, 59 Fed.
Reg. 51,396 (1994)).
gs Dey, 28 F.3d at 1454 n.8 (quoting EEOC proposed regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266. In
October 1994, the EEOC withdrew the proposed guidelines on harassment. See 59 Fed. Reg.
51,396.
"4 See Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F. Supp. 1393, 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Shellhammer v. Lewallen,
1 Fair liousing-Fair Lending Cases 15,472, at ¶ 16,128 (W.D. Ohio Nov. 22, 1983).
95 1 Fair Housing-Fair Lending Cases at ¶ 16,128.
96 Id.
97 Id. at I 16,127.
"8 873 F. Supp. at 1397-98,
876	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 38:861
to find that a landlord's unpermitted and intentional sexual touching
of a tenant constituted sexual harassment. The court noted:
Women remain disproportionately vulnerable to rape and
sexual assault, which can and often does shape women's in-
terpretations of words or behavior of a sexual nature, particu-
larly if unsolicited or occurring in an inappropriate con-
text. . . . The net result of the disparate experiences of
women and men concerning harassment . . . is that a single
standard perpetuates. inequalities . . . . 99
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Gnerre v. Massa-
chusetts- Commission Against Discrimination, on the other hand, imposed
the reasonable person standard.m The court held that a plaintiff need
not show that the harassment affected her emotional well-being, only
that the harassment would have rendered the tenancy significantly less
desirable to a reasonable person in her position.m
Several other cases did not address the debate between the rea-
sonable person and reasonable woman standards. In fact, many courts
do not use that terminology at all in their opinions. For example, in
Honce v. Vigil, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that a
claim is actionable "when the offensive behavior unreasonably inter-
feres with the use and enjoyment of the premises." 1 °2 In Grieger u Sheets,
the District Court of the Northern District of Illinois stated that the
harassment must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive" to alter the con-
ditions of the housing arrangementws and make the "continued ten-
ancy burdensome and significantly less desirable than if the harass-
ment were not occurring." 1 " When courts do not specifically turn their
attention to the perception of the victim, the presumption is that they
will decide whether the tenancy was burdensome based on societal
norms or expectations, in effect applying the reasonable person stand-
ard. Even when courts do not employ the reasonableness language, as
in the above cases, the implication is that the landlord's conduct would
be considered sexual harassment if a "reasonable person" would con-
sider it such.
99 Id. at 1397.
"fi 524 N.E.2d 84, 88 (Mass. 1988).
lin Id. There is no indication that the court took into account such factors as her gender and
race when considering the reasonable person in her position.
102 I F.3d 1085, 1090 (10th Cir. 1993).
I " No. 87C 6567, 1989 WL 38707, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 1989) (quoting Shellhammer, I Fair
Housing-Fair Lending Cases at 1 16,128).
"H Id.
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Thus, in hostile housing environment cases, the lower courts have
not yet agreed on a standard. Since the issue is also unresolved in the
employment context, it remains uncertain what direction the Supreme
Court will take when called upon to determine a standard in rental
sexual harassment cases.
II. WHO IS THE REASONABLE VICTIM IN HOUSING CASES?:
LIMITATIONS Or EXISTING STANDARDS
Legitimate criticisms exist of both the reasonable person and the
reasonable woman standards as applied to sexual harassment cases.
Courts have not been able to agree on a standard because both alter-
natives tend to perpetuate stereotypes and overgeneralize about how
a reasonable person should act. The reasonableness standards are
especially problematic when applied to housing sexual harassment
cases.
Women disproportionately suffer the brunt of sexual harassment,
and gender bias still pervades the legal system.'°' Accordingly, the legal
system needs to account for the woman's perspective regarding appro-
priate behavior. The reasonable person standard is ineffective because
it fails to reflect women's perceptions of what constitutes sexual har-
assment. The reasonable woman standard evaluates the conduct from
the woman's perspective and thus minimizes the risk of reinforcing the
prevailing level of sexual harassment in society." The reasonable
woman standard, however, does not go far enough and in fact creates
new problems. Just as society perceives the reasonable person as male,
it also assumes this mythical person is a white, middle-class heterosex-
ual. While the reasonable woman standard takes a positive step by
turning the attention to women, it risks addressing only the perspective
of the white, middle-class woman,'° 7 often failing the unique cross-sec-
tion of society most often confronted with landlord sexual harass-
ment—low-income minority women."
Just as a reasonable woman might consider certain incidents sex-
ual harassment, while a reasonable man might not, there are instances
105 See Deborah S, Brenneman, Comment, From a Woman's Point of Vim,: The Use of the
Reasonable Woman Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 60 U. Cm. L. REV. 1281, 1294, 1299
(1992); Piefer, supra note 58, at 99.
"'Because the reasonable woman standard would not permit a highly sensitive woman to
prevail, the standard retains the objective element of reasonableness. Brenneman, supra note
105, at 1296; Piefer, supra note 58, at 99.
197 See ELIZAWEit V. SPEI.MAN, INESSEN'EIAL WOMEN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST
Ttiour;wr 4 (1989).
"'See infra notes 144-46.
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where a reasonable low-income woman might react differently from a
reasonable affluent woman. One commentator has noted that "[how
income tenants are more vulnerable to economic intimidation than
are their wealthier counterparts. They are also less likely to know their
rights and how to negotiate the legal system, and are more likely to
believe that they cannot avoid harassment."m° Take, for example, a
landlord who constantly bothers his tenant—he telephones her, invites
her to dinner, asks her personal questions, makes insinuating com-
ments about visitors to her apartment and questions her about her sex
life. Susan, a financially secure tenant living in an area where rental
housing is abundant, has the option of suing the landlord for sexual
harassment or merely moving out and finding a new apartment.
Sharon, however, a single mother who lives with her two children in
subsidized housing in the city, does not have such clear options. Sharon
waited four years to get her subsidized apartment. The waiting list for
subsidized housing in the city is now as long as eight years)'° Even if
she sues her landlord for sexual harassment and wins, she might still
be forced to move out of the apartment if she remains uncomfortable
around her landlord after suing him. Because the consequences to
Sharon of giving up her apartment are much graver than to Susan, her
perception of her living environment might be different from Susan's.
In the above vignette, the reasonable woman standard would be
too narrow. The reasonable woman standard is based on the notion
that a paradigm exists that reflects the common experiences of all
women.'" Women are not a homogenous group. By assuming that
there is an "essential" woman, the reasonable woman standard ignores
the realities of differences among womer0 12
 and fails to protect the
169
 Litt, supra note 7, at 234-35.
"° In most urban areas, long waiting lists exist for a limited number of Section 8 certificates
and vouchers. In Washington, D.C., for example, the waiting list includes 15,683 people. In
Philadelphia, the figure is 16,620. See Vobejda, supra note 4, at A27. For many families, that means
waiting as long as eight years or more. See id.; see also Theodore C. Taub, The Future of Affordable
Housing, 22 URB. LAW. 659 (1990), See generally Deborah Kenn, Fighting the Housing Crisis with
Underachieving Programs: The Problem With Section 8, 44 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMI'. L. 77,
81-82 (1993) ("Because demand far exceeds supply, the application process in most jurisdictions
is only open for short periods each year. . . . Once on a waiting list, a tenant has little hope of
receiving a certificate or voucher unless he or she falls into one of the preference categories
established by HUD. . . . The few families who manage to acquire Section 8 certificates or
vouchers face several hurdles in obtaining affordable, decent housing. Within sixty days of
receiving the certificate, the eligible family must ... find an apartment that qualifies for the
program and a landlord willing to accept a Section 8 certificate or voucher.").
III See Johnson, supra note 67, at 626.
112 See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 582,
591-92 (1990); Katharine T. Bartlett, MacKinnon's Feminism: Power on Whose Terms?, 75 CAI.. L.
REV. 1559, 1566 (1987) (book review).
September 19971	 TITLE VIII CLAIMS	 879
majority of landlord sexual harassment claimants who do not conform
to the norms of the "reasonable woman." Proponents of the reasonable
woman standard assert that there is no consensus between men and
women regarding what behavior constitutes sexual harassment." 3 Ap-
plying the reasonable woman standard, however, necessarily implies
that there is consensus among women over how the sexes should relate
to each other. Such an assumption ignores the complexities of a vic-
tim's situation. 14
 How one perceives a particular interaction, such as
an alleged act of sexual harassment, will be a function of more than
just one's sex—it will be a function of one's "personal psychological
makeup and of social factors, such as one's race, sex, class, etc. "115
Therefore, just as the reasonable person standard perpetuates inequali-
ties based on gender, the reasonable woman standard may perpetuate
11 See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and Transformation of Workplace Norms,
42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1210 (1989); Brenneman, supra note 105, at 1293-95; Piefer, supra note
58, at 86.
114 This problem operates on a larger theoretical level in feminism as illustrated by "essen-
tialist" theory. Catharine MacKinnon has asserted that men have their feet on the necks of all
women, regardless of race or class. CATHARINE MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex
Discrimination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32, 45 (1987). Many believe, however, that MacKinnon
fails to take into account social, cultural and historical circumstances. Under MacKinnon's view,
white women become the norm, or pure, "essential" women. See Harris, supra note 112, at 595.
An essentialist approach seeks to isolate a uniform "essential" woman's experience, described
independent of other characteristics such as race, class and sexual orientation. See id. at 584. The
attention of essentialist theory is turned to white, middle-class women, confusing the condition
of one group for the condition of the whole. See SPELMAN, supra note 107, at 4. By assuming that
there is an "essential" woman, the theories ignore the realities of differences among women. See
Harris, supra note 112, at 591-92; Barden, ,supra note 112, at 1566.
II5 Ehrenreich, supra note 15, at 1194. For example, the reasonable woman standard does
not recognize the interactive effect of discrimination, which can affect African-American women
much differently than it affects African-American men or white women. See Abrams, .supra note
113, at 1214 & n.124. For black women, two statuses (black and female) are combined and create
a condition that is worse than the sum of the two parts. See Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and
the Constitution: Finding Our Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV, 9, 9 (1989).
African-American women have a dual stigma of being black and being women, see id. at 12, and
are more vulnerable to both race and gentler discrimination. SeeJudith A. Winston, Mirror, Mirror
on the Wall: Title VII, Section 1981, and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Civil Rights Act
of 1990, 79 CAL. L. REV. 775, 797 (1991). "In order to support this degraded status, society has
created a system of mythology and misinterpretations about black women which further limits
the life opportunities of black women." Scales-Trent, supra, at 13; see BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A
WOMAN? BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 51-86 (1981). Myths still prevail that African-American
women are promiscuous, hot-blooded and unabashed in their desire to achieve sexual fulfillment.
See Winston, supra, at 785-86. "The myth of the unvirtuous Black woman remains, only now her
alleged lack of virtue is reason to justify the boss's sexual harassment of her." Peggy R. Smith,
Separate Identities: Black Women, Work and Title VII, 14 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 21, 74 (1991). See,
e.g., Brief for Respondent Michelle Vinson, Merkur Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1985)
(No.84-1979). See also MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 53-54. As a result, women of color have
different perceptions of the world than black men or white women.
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existing inequalities based on race, class, sexual orientation and other
factors when it fails to consider the point of view of subordinated
groups other than women. 16
Of course, the reasonable woman standard could be altered to
take into account factors such as race, class and sexual orientation.
This seemingly natural extension of the reasonable woman standard,
however, is quickly complicated when taken to the extreme. That is, if
every distinctive characteristic defining a person is taken into account,
the standard will eventually become completely individualized. For
example, the reasonable Hispanic lesbian woman standard might be
workable, but what about the reasonable thirty-seven-year-old obese
single woman living on Main Street? Eventually, the standard becomes
purely subjective, leaving the landlord no clear standard by which to
evaluate his own conduct.
In addition, using membership in a particular group to define the
manner in which an individual will react to a particular situation leads
to the perpetuation of stereotypes. A person may belong to many
categories (i.e. race, gender and economic class), but no one category
controls how a person interprets every event that person experiences
in life. Rather, one category may shape a person's outlook in some
contexts, and another category or union of categories may shape a
person's perception in other contexts." 7 Consequently, labeling some-
one by his or her gender or race does not automatically define how
that person will perceive the world. Reasonable people of the same
gender and race might react differently depending on other factors
such as class, religion or sexual orientation or according to a combi-
nation of several of these categories.
The reasonable woman standard and its progeny evaluate conduct
from the perspective of the victim, creating the additional problem of
false consciousness. If the defendant creates a hostile environment but
the "victim" does not perceive the conduct as improper or is not
bothered by it, then the conduct will not be actionable. False conscious-
ness allows improper behavior to go unremedied if groups are social-
ized to think that certain forms of the behavior are acceptable. For
example, Asian-American women are often perceived as "subservient,
obedient, passive, hardworking, and exotic."" 8 As a result "Asian-
American women themselves become convinced that they should be-
116 See Ehrenreich, supra note 15, at 1218.
" 7 See generally Joan Chalmers Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Mod-
ern Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296, 307.
"s Esther Ngan -Ling Chow, The Feminist Movement.. Where are all the Asian-American Women?,
in MAKING WAVES 362, 367 (Asian Women United of Cal, ed., 1989).
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have in accordance with these stereotyped expectations." Some
Asian-American women might therefore perceive certain harassing
behavior as acceptable. Behavior considered inappropriate by a great
part of society will thereby be permissible when directed at those
Asian-American women. As amici in Harris, the NAACP Legal Defense
and Education Fund and the National Council of Jewish Women ex-
plained this effect in the context of racial discrimination:
The day is long past when this Court would entertain any
suggestion that some forms of racial abuse are legal because
"reasonable" blacks would not be offended; the right to equal
treatment . . . does not ebb and flow with popular or judicial
notions of what forms of discrimination a "reasonable" black
would find tolerable or "merely annoying"; no woman should
have to endure "derogatory or unwelcome sexual remarks" as
a "condition of her job."1"
Both the reasonable person and the reasonable woman standards
create problems when applied in the housing context. Neither stand-
ard has been uniformly used and neither can be agreed upon. The
reasonable person standard is inflexible in its definition of how peo-
ple should behave, while the reasonable woman standard perpetuates
stereotypes and fails to consider differences among women. As Cath-
arine MacKinnon noted in an Amicus Curiae brief to the Supreme
Court in Harris
Measonableness, whether couched in the language of a rea-
sonable person or a reasonable woman, operates as a vehicle
for the introduction of sex stereotyping, diverts the otherwise
straightforward Title VII inquiry into the defendant's con-
duct, and devolves into an inquiry about the character of the
victim in light of societal norms. 12 '
A standard is needed that takes into account the particular charac-
teristics and circumstances of the parties that comprise any specific
situation, without perpetuating stereotypes and inflexible catego-
ries.
119 Id. at 367.
120 BARBARA A. BABCOCK ET Al.., SEX DISCRIMINATION AND Tur. LAW: HISTORY, PRACTICE AND
THEORY 616 (26 ed. 1996) (quoting Brief Amici Curiae of the NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund and the National Council of Jewish Women in support of Petitioner at 21-24,
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (No. 92-1168)).
121
 Brief of Amici Curiae NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, Catharine MacKinnon,
et al. 21-22,15-22, Harris (No, 92-1168),
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Ill. THE POWER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LANDLORD AND TENANT
Rental sexual harassment specifically involves victims who are
often subordinated to white middle-class men in our society. Usually
these victims are socially, politically and economically powerless. Un-
derstanding the connection between sexual harassment and tenant
powerlessness might help to explain the relative actions of the harasser
and the victim.
Like sexual harassment in the workplace, sexual harassment in
rental housing rests upon the imbalance of power. Landlords, almost
by definition, have significant power over their tenants. An unequal
power relationship in which a man has the upper hand often leads to
sexual harassment of women. The power matrix between a landlord
and tenant, however, is not only a function of gender. A landlord's
power also derives from economic dominance due to housing short-
ages or from other factors, such as race or class.
Historically, the allocation of property in society has led to the
economic dominance of the landlord over the tenant. The systematic
domination of tenants by landlords arises from the economic and
social inequalities between the two groups, based on "centuries of
culture regarding landowning and its centrality to `worth." 122 The
relationship between landlord and tenant therefore not only "condi-
tion [s] how the people relate to each other, but to an important extent
define[s] the constitutive terms of the relationship." 23
Landlords may have additional power over their tenants due to
more accidental circumstances, such as the exact configuration of the
housing market. When housing is scarce, the disparity in bargaining
power between landlords and tenants is greatest. At such times, land-
lords generally have a greater ability to affect the low-income tenants'
lives than the reverse. 124 To influence tenants, landlords can threaten
to evict or refuse to make necessary repairs to the dwelling. A land-
lord's threat of eviction can be devastating to a tenant who has meager
alternative housing options. A landlord's failure to make repairs can
be equally damaging when the housing does not meet basic standards
of health and safety.
Tenants, in contrast, have fewer and less powerful options when
dissatisfied with a landlord's behavior. Tenants can threaten to vacate
122 Bezdek, supra note 12, at 540.
I" Id. at 540 n.24 (quoting Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57,
105 (1984)).
I ." See Keller, supra note 12, at 1668-69.
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the premises or withhold rent. When faced with a shortage of housing,
however, a tenant's threat to vacate the premises is likely to be met with
inaction. The same reasons that heighten a tenant's need or desire to
stay in a particular unit contribute to the landlord's indifference to
that tenant's staying in the unit.' 25 Vacating an apartment is a weak
option when the landlord is effectively guaranteed a replacement ten-
ant. The tenant's strongest weapon—withholding rent—is often inef-
fective when the rental income is needed for building maintenance.' 2"
In addition, the law may permit an eviction on the basis of failure to
pay rent alone, even if the tenant has a legitimate grievance against
the landlord.' Moreover, the more tenants a landlord has, the less the
economic effect on the landlord of one tenant's withholding of rent.
Finally, the low-income tenant's personal attachment to the physical
unit as her home and her place in the neighborhood is likely to be
much greater than the landlord's attachment to any particular tenant
living in the unit.' 28
 "To cause a disruption in the landlord's life equiva-
lent to the disruption a landlord would cause by simply 'omitting' to
fix a leaky ceiling would require positive action on the tenant's part." 129
Thus, tight housing markets exacerbate the power imbalance between
landlord and tenant.
During the past few decades, the availability of low-income hous-
ing has steadily declined.'" In the 1970s and 1980s, a series of socio-
economic conditions arose in American urban areas which heavily
impacted housing availability."' While the rest of the country was
seeing economic revitalization in the 1980s, low-income Americans
were experiencing a serious housing crisis." 2 Many credit this low-in-
come housing crisis to budget cuts directed at welfare programs and
to inflation. 13" Between 1970 and 1983, the median monthly rental
rates for housing in American cities increased more than double the
rate of salary growth over the same period.'"' Simultaneously, urban
housing built earlier in the century became increasingly dilapidated.
125 See id. at 1667.
126 See id. at 1672,
127 In many jurisdictions, a landlord's breach of covenant is independent of the tenant's duty
to pay rent. See generally ItoBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT
§ 3:4, 96 & 0.58 (1980 & Supp. 1997) (citing cases).
128 See Keller, supra note 12, at 1668.
129 /d. at 1669.
iso See infra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
131 See Rosenthal, .supra note 12, at 590-91.
122 See id. at 591.
133 See id.
134 See id. (citing ARLENE ZAREMIIKA, THE URHAN HOUSING CRISIS 2 (1990)).
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"In addition, as the United States economy became more service ori-
ented, urban areas, formerly the location for vast industries, lost large
numbers of blue-collar jobs."'" "The dearth of urban housing alterna-
tives and jobs forced many families to live in shelters or seek other
housing alternatives."'" Because most cities now face a shortage of
low-income housing, the power imbalance between a landlord and a
low-income tenant is likely to be greatest."'
Other factors, such as race and gender, can add to a tenant's
subordinate position.'" For example, people are socialized into equat-
ing power with whiteness and masculinity. As a result, black women
often experience a feeling of powerlessness, leading to increased vul-
nerability to sexual harassment.'"
As a result of the traditional subordination of minority women and
the current rental housing shortage, low-income minority women are
most susceptible to domination by their landlords. Low-income minor-
ity women also comprise a disproportionate number of renters. The
standard applied to housing sexual harassment cases must address the
subordinated status of these women who fail to conform to tradition-
ally white, middle-class male standards of conduct.
135 Id.
1516 Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 591.
137 In Philadelphia, for example, the number of housing units costing $150 per month
decreased from 89,062 to 22,554 during the 1980s while the median monthly rent increased from
$165 to $365. See ZAREMBKA, supra note 134, at 2-7. Similarly, in Baltimore, between 1979 and
1987, the number of renters with incomes under $10,000 increased by 7%, but the number of
low rent units renting at the federal affordability standard of 30% of income, or $250 per month,
had declined by 32%. See Bezdek, supra note 12, at 544 n.36 (citing SCOTT BARANCIK & MARK
SHEET, A PLACE 1U CALL HOME: THE CRISIS IN HOUSING FOR THE POOR—BALTIMORE MARYLAND
9 (1991)). In Dallas-Fort Worth, studies show that 81,000 low-income families pay more than half
of their income for rent. See Craig Flournoy, Study Reports Lower-Income Families Caught in
Housing Crisis, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 23, 1995, at 1D. See generally EDWARD B. LAZE RE
ET AL., A PLACE TO CALL. HOME, THE Low INCOME HOUSING CRISIS CONTINUES (1991): Kenn,
supra note 110; Taub, supra note 110, at 659 ("In the wake of significant cutbacks in federal
funding of housing, the availability of affordable housing for low-income persons has become an
issue of national concern.").
158
 "In a highly industrialized society run by a hierarchical bureaucracy and based on indi-
vidualistic competition, many socially constructed markers of group membership are used to
allocate power." Aida Hurtado, Relating to Privilege: Seduction and Rejection in the Subordination
of White Women and Women of Color, 14 SIGNS 833, 833 (1989).
139 For an in-depth discussion of gender and race powerlessness issues, see generally Scales-
Trent, supra note 115, at 33-34. See also Angel, supra note 57 (noting that because judges possess
a position of power in our society, women are discouraged from resisting improper advances from
judges, and sexual harassment by judges has gone unremedied).
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IV. A PROPOSED STANDARD
Power is the root of sexual harassment.'" The "reasonableness"
standards do not account for the unique power relationship that often
exists between a landlord and a tenant. Because most landlords have
some, if not significant, power over their tenants, I propose a standard
which recognizes the powerlessness of sexual harassment victims.
Rather than focusing on people's inherent similarities or differences,
the law should focus on relations between the oppressor and the
oppressed' 41 and question the defendant's actions in light of the power
differentials between the parties. This shift in focus requires abandon-
ing the reasonableness standards altogether."'
A. Title VII Reasoning Inappropriate for Situations Involving the Home
As discussed above, the debate over the reasonable person and
reasonable woman standards in the employment context has not yet
been resolved. Several circuit courts continue to apply the reasonable
woman standard despite the Supreme Court's ruling in Harris. Regard-
less of how that issue plays out in the employment context, it would be
a mistake for courts to follow suit in the housing context without
separate analysis and discussion.
Because of some fundamental differences between the work envi-
ronment and rental housing, serious problems can arise if courts too
closely equate the effects of workplace sexual harassment with the
effects of rental housing sexual harassment. The majority of Title VIII
sexual harassment cases involve a different cross-section of society from
140 One study of sexual harassment in the workplace shows that in over 80% of cases
examined, the harasser occupied a more powerful position in the organization than the victim.
See Ronni Sandroft Sexual Harassment: 'The Inside Story, in WORKING WOMAN, June 1992, at 47,
48; see also Stephanie Riger, Gender Dilemmas in Sexual Harassment Policies and Procedures, 46 AM.
PSYCHOL. 497, 497 (1991) (citing several studies concluding that "[w]omen with low power and
status, whether due to lower age, being single or divorced, or being in a marginal position in the
organization, are more likely to be harassed").
141 Angela Harris urges that we focus on "relationships, not essences." Harris, supra note 112,
at 612.
142 Several commentators have suggested the abandonment of reasonableness as an evaluat-
ing tool, recognizing the harm inherent in the very concept of reasonableness, See, e.g., Eileen
M. Blackwood, The Reasonable Woman in Sexual Harassment Law and the Case for Subjectivity, 16
VT. L. REV. 1005, 1026 (1992) ("To fully address the concerns of women (and racial and cultural
minorities) courts mast abandon the notion that law embodies an objective, neutral viewpoint
and explore a subjective standard of harm."); Ehrenreich, supra note 15, at 1232 ("the homoge-
nous image of society that results from the traditional equation of reasonableness with societal
consensus is simply too harmful, excluding all but the dominant elite, to justify retention.").
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Title VII sexual harassment cases. In employment discrimination cases,
the victim of sexual harassment is usually a woman, 143 and often a
minority. 144
 When sexual harassment occurs in the housing context,
however, the typical victim is not only a minority woman, 145
 but a poor
minority woman. 146 In addition to the problem of subordination of
women by men and discrimination based on race, rental housing
sexual harassment also involves exploitation of poor people by those
in positions of economic power. This typically subordinated cross-sec-
tion of society often needs protection on the multiple grounds of sex,
race and class discrimination.
Rental housing sexual harassment is particularly invasive because
it violates the sanctity of the home:
When sexual harassment occurs at work, at that moment or
at the end of the work day, the woman may remove herself
from the offensive environment. She will choose whether to
resign from her position based on economic and personal
considerations. In contrast, when the harassment occurs in a
woman's home, it is a complete invasion in her life. Ideally,
home is the haven from the troubles of the day. When home
is not a safe place, a woman may feel distressed and, often,
immobile.'A 7
As one commentator has noted, "[w]ithout understating the seri-
ousness of sexual harassment in the workplace, judges and juries
must recognize that conduct which may be a mere annoyance at
work can be a nightmarish violation of privacy and personal auton-
omy when it takes place in one's home."148
The home is a "moral nexus between liberty, privacy, and freedom
of association." 149
 Accordingly, it is not uncommon for the law to pro-
143 See MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 28 (stating that women are disproportionately the victims
of sexual harassment); NANCY DODD MCCANN & THOMAS A. MCGINN, HARASSED: 100 WOMEN
DEFINE INAPPROPRIATE BEHAVIOR IN THE WORKPLACE 73 (1992) (stating that 85-95% of reported
sexual harassment is directed toward women).
144
 Black women make up a disproportionate number of plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases.
Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Gender;  and Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1467, 1470 (1992).
145 See id. By way of illustration, a study in Baltimore showed that 71% of tenants appearing
in court were women. See Bezdek, supra note 12, at 540 n.21.
146 In a 1986 survey assessing the incidence of residential sexual harassment nationwide,
results indicated that 75% of the tenants who had been sexually harassed had annual incomes
under $10,000 and only 2% earned over $20,000 per year. See Litt, supra note 7, at 233 11.25
(citing Callan, supra note 12, at 1067); see also Bezdek, supra note 12, at 542 n.30 (Baltimore).
147 Cahan, supra note 12, at 1073.
148 Litt, supra note 7, at 238-39.
149
 MARGARFI' JANE RAPIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 56 (1993).
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vide greater protections to situations involving the home. Several con-
stitutional provisions provide special protection for the home, 150 and
the sanctity of the home has consistently been protected by the United
States Supreme Court. 151 A clear example is Stanley v. Georgia, in which
the Supreme Court held that a stale may not prosecute a person for
possessing obscene materials in her home.' 52 Although the Court
rested its holding on the "philosophy of the First Amendment," 153 it
was influenced by "an appreciation of our society's traditional connec-
tion between one's home and one's sense of autonomy and person-
hood." 154
The privacy aspect of sanctity of the home is of particular impor-
tance. Home is a place where "intimate things are kept from prying
eyes, and intimate relationships are carried on away from prying
15° For example, the Third Amendment stales "[n]t) Soldier shall be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in dine of war, but in a manner prescribed by law." U.S.
CousT. amend. III. The Fourth Amendment stales that:
the right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable search and seizures, shall not he violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persc ins or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNs'r. amend. IV.
151 See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (holding that while warrantless arrests
in public are constitutional, warrantless arrests in the home are not); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961) (applying the Fourth Amendment to the states); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)
(holding unconstitutional an act that authorizes the federal courts to take the allegations as true
in revenue cases, where the Government's attorney moves to compel a defendant to produce
private papers, books or invoices).
Distinctions are often made in property law between residential and commercial properties.
For example, anti-discrimination laws do not apply to how owner-occupants pick their tenants.
See Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (2) (1994). Also, the implied warranty of
habitability, a law in most states requiring landlords to maintain rental premises in a condition
fit for human habitation, applies to all residential leases. See, e.g., Green v. Superior Ct., 517 P.2d
1168, 1176 (Cal. 1974); Pole Realty Co. v. Sorrells, 417 N.E.2d 1297, 1299-1300 (Ill. 1981);
Delamater v. Foreman, 239 N.W. 148, 149 (Minn. 1931); Marini v. Ireland, 265 A.2d 526, 534
(N.J. 1970); Pugh v. Holmes, 405 A.2d 897, 900 (Pa. 1979); Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658,
660-61 (Tex. 1978); Foisy v. Wyman, 515 P.2d 160, 164 (Wash. 1973); Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E2d
114, 123 (W. Va. 1978). The implied warranty of habitability, however, does not apply to commer-
cial leases. See generally ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET Al.., Toe LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.38, at 309 (2d
ed. 1993); Thomas M. Flemming, Annotation, Implied Warranty of Fitness or Suitability in Com-
mercial Leases—Modern Status, 76 A.L.R.4th 928, 933 (1990).
Likewise, under the homestead exemption in bankruptcy law, see, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
427.060 (Baldwin 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20:1 (West 1979 & Stipp. 1997); N.D. CENT.
Cook §§ 28-22-02(7), 47-18-01 (1991 & Stipp. 1995); OKLA. STAT, ANN. tit. 31, § I (A) (West
1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 101 (1989 & Stipp. 1996), property that is occupied by the owner
as a home is exempted from a levy or judicial sale. See 40 Ant. juit. 2o Homestead § 1 (1968).
152 594 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
1513 Id, at 566.
15 ' 1 P...runs!, supra note 149, at 57.
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ears."'" As noted by one court, the principal object to be effectuated
by granting special protection to the home is "to preserve the home
to the family, even at the sacrifice of just demands, for the reason that
the preservation of the home is deemed of paramount importance."'"
Because of these fundamental differences between workplace and
housing sexual harassment, rote application of Title VII reasoning to
Title VIII harassment cases would be a mistake.
B. The Logic of Adopting a Standard from Property and Contracts
Principles far Landlord-Tenant Cases
Neither Title VII nor Title VIII mandates that harassing behavior
be evaluated under a reasonableness standard.'" The language of both
Acts simply instructs inquiry into the defendant's conduct.'" In fact,
prior to 1986, neither Title VII nor Title VIII sex or race discrimination
cases required proof that a plaintiff had acted in accord with "someone
else's notion of reasonable behavior." 159
 The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., was the first court to
require a reasonable person standard in sexual harassment cases.' 6°
Judge Keith's dissent criticized the reasonable person standard and
suggested the reasonable woman standard as an alternative.''' Since
then, courts and commentators have "unquestionably accepted the
inevitability of having a 'reasonableness' screen" 162
 and have seized on
the familiar feminist debate between "woman" and "person." 163
The Rabidue court adopted the reasonableness standard from tort
law. Current landlord-tenant law, however, is largely adopted from
contract law.' 64
 Traditionally, landlord-tenant law was governed com-
pletely by property law. A lease conveyed an interest in land—the
landlord conveyed possession of the property in exchange for rent,
and the tenant became the owner of the estate for the term of the
lease. Accordingly, the transaction was governed by the principle of
caveat emptor, 165
 and any problems which arose during the course of
155 Id. at 60.
°1f McPhee v. O'Rourke, 15 P. 420, 423 (Colo. 1887); see also Hammond State Bank & Trust
Co. v. Broderick, 154 So. 739, 741 (La. 1934); Grace v. Grace, 104 N.W. 969, 971 (Minn. 1905).
157
 See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
156 See id.
159
 See BABCOCK, supra note 120, at 617.
16°805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) ("trier of fact ... must adopt the perspective of a
reasonable person's reaction to a similar environment"), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
161
 See id. (Keith, J., dissenting).
162 13Aacocx, supra note 120, at 617.
1"9 See id.
I" See. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 127, § 1:1.
195 The lessee took the premises as he or she found them. See id. § 2.
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the tenancy belonged to the tenant. There were no implied warranties,
and the landlord had no implied duty to repair.m6
During the last several decades, however, there has been a shift in
the law—courts and state legislatures have re-analyzed the underlying
concepts of landlord-tenant law and injected contract principles to
provide extra protections to tenants. Legislation has significantly modi-
fied the traditional landlord-tenant relationship,' 67 and courts have
begun to treat leases like contracts rather than conveyances of property
rights, adopting contract doctrines to protect tenants from unequal
bargaining power.' 68 For example, most states have adopted laws requir-
ing landlords to mitigate damages and have adopted the contract
doctrine of breach by anticipatory repudiation.'" Most states also have
implied warranties of habitability guaranteeing minimum safety stand-
ards, and the principles of illegality of contract have been applied to
the letting of premises whose condition substantially violates municipal
housing regulations. 171 Because landlord-tenant law is now governed
by both property and contract law, it makes sense for courts to follow
this trend and adopt a standard for landlord sexual harassment from
those areas of the law rather than from tort law.
C. Shifting the Focus Away From the Victim: Implied Warranty of
Habitability and Unconscionability Law as Models
The reasonableness standards improperly focus the analysis on the
perceptions of the victim. I propose a standard that shifts that focus in
a two-step analysis. First, I suggest courts evaluate the behavior of the
alleged harasser, the landlord. Regardless of who the tenant is and what
the tenant perceives, certain conduct by the landlord should be con-
sidered per se harassment. I borrow the idea for this component of
the standard from the property concept of implied warranty of habi-
tability, where the standards for compliance are quite precise and do
not depend on the factual context. Second, courts must evaluate the
relationship between the landlord and the tenant. Even if the conduct
is not considered sexual harassment per se, it still may violate Title VIII
if there is a significant disparity of bargaining power between the two
I WI see id.
11i7 "Probably the most comprehensive of die statutory developments is the Un fibrin Residen-
tial Landlord and Tenant Act [ukuril] which in many respects views a residential lease as a
bilateral contract rendering performance of many of its obligations interdependent." See id. § 1.1,
at 4 (citing URLTA § 1.101 cmt.).
1" See generally id. § 1.1, at 3.
169 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRAcrs § 12.12, at 896 n.2. (2d ed. 1990),
171 See, id. § 8.20, at 655-56.
171 See generally SCHOSHINSKI, supra HOW 127 § 1:1, at 3.
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parties. I adopt this component of the standard in part from the
contracts principle of unconscionability. Using the above legal doc-
trines as models seems particularly appropriate given that each doc-
trine attempts to protect powerless parties from forced submission to
onerous conditions.'"
1. Does the Landlord's Conduct Constitute Per Se Sexual
Harassment?
Landlords must know that certain behavior toward their tenants
is impermissible in all circumstances. To define the scope of impermis-
sible conduct for the first inquiry of my proposed two-step analysis, I
suggest a standard whereby certain conduct, regardless of who the
parties are and how they are affected, will presumptively create a
hostile environment in violation of Title VIII. Prohibited conduct will
include all criminal acts directed at the tenant, such as assault and
battery,"s and will specifically include the petty misdemeanor of "har-
assment." 17 ' This standard will protect "the interest in individual dignity
against offensive contact with one's person."'"
Section 250.4 of the Model Penal Code (harassment) states:
A person commits a petty misdemeanor if, with purpose to
harass another, he: (1) makes a telephone call without pur-
pose of legitimate communication; or (2) insults, taunts or
challenges another in a manner likely to provoke violent or
disorderly response; or (3) makes repeated communications
anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offen-
sively course language; or (4) subjects another to an offensive
touching; or (5) engages in any other course of alarming
conduct serving no legitimate purpose of the actor.'m
The specific types of actions listed in subsections (1)-(4) are often
the subject of hostile environment cases, and courts have not come
to a consensus regarding whether such bothersome, but not neces-
sarily intolerable, actions should constitute sexual harassment. No-
tably, to constitute a crime, the enumerated types of conduct must
172 1n fact, the landmark decision regarding unconscionability, see Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965), and the landmark decision regarding implied
warranties of habitability, seeJavins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970), were authored by the same judge, Skelly Wright.
173 See generally Rollin M. Perkins, Non-Homicide Offenses Against the Person, 26 13.U. L. REv.
119 (1946).
171 See Mom. PENAL CODE § 250.4 (1962).
175 /d. § 250.4 cmt. 4.
176 Id. § 250.4.
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have been done "with purpose to harass another."'" Requiring in-
tent to harass should result in less disagreement.
Subsection (5) prohibits any conduct which is so alarming as to
serve "no legitimate purpose of the actor." This purposely general
section was meant to "proscribe forms of harassment that cannot be
anticipated and precisely stated in advance,'" adding some ambiguity
regarding what conduct constitutes harassment. The section is not,
however, an "open-ended catch-all." 18" It requires "unarguably repre-
hensible instances of intentional imposition on another." 18 ' Conduct
will be per se harassment if it is knowingly offensive or so alarming as
to be obviously objectionable.
Prohibiting a prescribed set of conduct will divert attention away
from who is renting from whom, toward what tenants are entitled to
expect when they enter into a leasehold, without regard to race, gender
or class. This style of analysis is consistent with the direction most
courts have taken in landlord-tenant law. For example, in most states,
pursuant to the implied warranty of habitability, the landlord has an
obligation to convey habitable premises." In analyzing whether hous-
ing conditions are in breach of the implied warranty of habitability,
courts do not consider how the tenant perceives the conditions or
whether the tenant is willing to live in substandard housing conditions
for the opportunity to pay lower rent. The obligation is usually predi-
cated on municipal housing codes, where the standards for compliance
are quite precise.'" The law protects tenants from "choosing" to en-
dure harsh living conditions simply because they are poor. 184
' 77 1d.
' 78 !d. § '250.4(5).
179 MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.4 cmt, 5.
181 Id.
182 AS noted in Javins, the landmark decision dealing with the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity: "When American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek 'shelter' today, they seek a well known
package of goods and services—a package which includes riot merely walls and ceilings, but also
adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors,
proper sanitation, and proper maintenance." 428 F.2d at 1074.
188 See SCHOtillINSKI, supra note 127, § 3:17. Where housing regulations are not in effect, the
implied warranty of habitability may simply require conformance with general community stand-
ards of suitability for occupancy. In those cases, a breach of the implied warranty must be
determined in the light of the particular circumstances of each case. See
m The implied warranty of habitability has received a lot of scholarly attention. Many
commentators criticize the implied warranty of habitability as overly simplistic and paternalistic.
See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 71i3 (1983).
They suggest that if landlords are forced to comply with housing standards, they will simply pass
their increased costs on to the tenant or take their property off the rental market altogether,
thereby decreasing the housing stock available to low-income tenants. See Daniel P. Schwallie, The
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The rationale for protecting tenants' legitimate expectations of
quality is based in large part on the unequal relationship between the
landlord and the tenant:
the inequality in bargaining power between landlord and
tenant has been well documented. Tenants have very little
leverage to enforce demands for better housing. Various im-
pediments to competition in the rental housing market, such
as racial and class discrimination and standardized form
leases, mean that landlords place tenants in a take it or leave
it situation. The increasingly severe shortage of adequate
housing further increases the landlord's bargaining power
and escalates the need for maintaining and improving the
existing stock: 85
When tenants are not in a position to bargain for better living
conditions, they should not be forced to submit to living condi-
tions that we as a society have deemed unlivable. If the conduct is
not sufficiently pervasive or egregious to satisfy the first prong, then
courts must proceed to the second prong to determine whether the
power the landlord has over the tenant elevates his conduct, which
might be acceptable in some circumstances, to the level of sexual
harassment.
2. Does the Landlord's Conduct Constitute Sexual Harassment in
Light of the Power He Has over the Tenant?
The per se violations are the easier cases. A landlord should not
be permitted continually to attack a tenant in a sexual way, verbally or
physically, without her consent. What if, however, a landlord makes
comments about a tenant's appearance, persists in telephoning her
without intent to harass, enters her apartment uninvited, or continually
touches his tenant in a non-sexual manner? Many courts and theorists
have debated whether these "milder" versions of behavior should be
considered sexual harassment. 186
Implied Warranty of Habitability as a Mechanism for Redistributing Income: Good Goal, Bad Policy,
40 CASE W. RES. L. RFIV. 525, 537-43 (1990). Proponents of the implied warranty of habitability
suggest, however, that it is necessary to require the compliance and ultimately provide more or
better housing subsidies to tenants. See, e.g., Rachel Camber, Note, The Incorporation of the Implied
Warranty of Habitability in Public Housing Programs, 38 WAsii. U. J. URB. & Co:v.1-7w L. 205
(1990); C. Stephen Lawrence, Survey, George Washington University v. Weintraub: Implied War-
ranty of Habitability as a (Ceremonial?) Sword, 33 CATli. U. L. REV. 1137 (1984).
185 faxtins, 428 F.2d at 1079.
186 See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 113; Adler & Pierce, supra note 67; Ehrenreich, supra note
15.
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It is no surprise that lawyers cannot come to a consensus about
such behavior, not only because men and women cannot agree about
what constitutes sexual harassment, but because it depends on the
context and circumstances. In the unlikely event that a landlord and
tenant are on equal footing, the milder types of behavior listed above,
although annoying, probably would not be considered sexual harass-
ment. Where the landlord has no power over his tenant, the tenant
can probably make the "bad" behavior stop. Where a tenant is afraid
of losing her apartment, however, she might not want to anger her
landlord. Tenants who are in a subordinate position to their landlords
should not have to tolerate even such "mild" harassment just because
the landlord knows he can get away with it. In those types of cases, the
landlord's conduct would constitute sexual harassment.
My proposed standard would hold landlords to a heightened
standard where they have significant power over their tenants. "In any
situation of power, the powerful have a moral obligation to see the
world from the point of view of those they govern or control, and to
exercise power in the interests of the governed." 187
The idea of evaluating alleged improper behavior through the
construct of power hierarchies is seen in contract law, where courts
examine the power imbalances between contracting parties to deter-
mine if resulting agreements are unconscionable. Because the land-
lord-tenant relationship is a contractual one, a similar paradigm can
be used to evaluate landlord sexual harassment.'"
a. Unconscionability Defined
"The concept of unconscionability was developed to prevent un-
just enforcement of onerous contractual terms which one party is able
to impose on another because of significant disparity in bargaining
power . ."'" The term unconscionability has been labeled "incapable
of precise definition."'" The Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"),
where the term originated, 191 does not define the term, and the com-
ments to UCC § 2-302 only give some general guidance as to the
meaning of the term: "the basic test is whether, in light of the general
commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular
1 "Adler & Pierce, supra note 67, at 826 (citing Deborah A. Stone, Race, Gender, and the
Supreme Court, TI IE AM. PROSPECT, Winter 1992, at 63, 69).
lligAlthough unconscionability law is useful as a model, it does not suggest a precise standard
for sexual harassment law. The standard I construct for hostile housing environment cases will
be based only in part on unconscionability law.
189 17A Am. init. 2n Contracts § 295 (1991).
190 FARNSWORTH, supra note 169, at 327.
191 See U .C.0 . § 2-302 (1995).
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trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be uncon-
scionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making
of the contract." 192
Although difficult to define precisely, "[il] nconscionability has
generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice
on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which
are unreasonably favorable to the other party."19' The bargaining defect
or "absence of meaningful choice" has been labeled "procedural"
unconscionability, and the evils in the resulting contract or "unreason-
ably favorable terms" have been labeled "substantive" unconscionabil-
ity;'94 both are usually necessary for a finding of unconscionability.' 95
Whether a party has a meaningful choice is determined on a case-
by-case basis. 196 A contracting party is considered to have no meaning-
ful choice when the economic position of that party is so poor that the
party is vulnerable to a grossly unequal bargain or when the disparity
in education or sophistication levels of the parties is so great that one
party is able to persuade the other to enter an agreement she might
not agree to if she fully understood the terms.' 97 When such gross
disparities exist, courts will examine the resulting contract terms to see
if they are so grossly unfair as to "shock the conscience of the court."
If such a substantive defect exists, courts will invoke the unconscion-
ability doctrine to protect the powerless party. 198
The goal of the unconscionability doctrine is to prevent oppres-
sion. The determination is not dependent solely on the perceptions of
the victim. Rather, courts look at the sophistication of the parties
relative to each other to determine if there is a disparity in bargaining
power in the particular situation. The victim's level of education or
status plays a role only to the extent it adds to the defendant's power.
The landmark unconscionability decision of Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co. 199 presents a useful illustration of the benefits of
192 1d. § 2-302 can. 1.
193
 Williams v. Walker-Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
194
 For the origin of these terms, see Arthur A. Leff, Unconseionability and the Code—The
Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967).
199 See id. Normally both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present in
order for a court to hold a contract or a clause unenforceable. See Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 845, 849 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). "However, there is a sliding-scale relationship between the
two concepts: the greater the degree of substantive unconscionability, the less degree of proce-
dural unconscionability that is required to annul the contract or clause" and vice versa. Id.
196 See Williams, 350 F.2d at 449.
197 See People's Mortgage Co. v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 856 F. Supp. 910, 927 (E.D.
Pa. 1994); In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 871 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
198 See, e.g., Williams, 350 F.2d at 445.
199 Id.
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focusing on power hierarchies. In Williams, a furniture store, Walker-
Thomas, sold Williams a $514 stereo on credit, knowing that Williams
received only a $218 monthly government check for herself and seven
children and that Williams already owed the store $164 for other items
she had bought under similar contracts."" During the five years prior
to the purchase of the stereo, Williams had made purchases valued at
a total of $1,800. 201 She had made payments totaling $1,400. 202
Under the terms of the contract, the seller reserved a security
interest in the stereo, with the right to repossess if Williams de-
faulted." The controversy centered on the following clause:
[T] he amount of each periodical installment payment to be
made by [purchaser] to the Company under this present
lease shall be inclusive of and not in addition to the amount
of each installment payment to be made by [purchaser] un-
der such prior leases, bills or accounts; and all payments now
and hereafter made by [purchaser] shall be credited pro rata on all
outstanding leases, bills and accounts due the Company by
[purchaser] at the time each such payment is made.'"
The clause spread her payments pro rata over all her outstanding
accounts until she paid her entire debt, in effect allowing the seller
to repossess every item she ever purchased from the store in the
event she defaulted on one payment."' Shortly after Williams pur-
chased the stereo, she defaulted on a payment and Walker-Thomas
sought to repossess all the items she had bought during the previous
five years. 20'
The Williams court held that enforcement of the contract could
be refused if the terms were "so extreme as to appear unconscionable
according to the mores and business practices of the time and place." 207
The court asserted that the terms of the contract must be considered
in light of the circumstances existing when the contract was made,"
explaining that even where a plaintiff reads the terms of a contract and
210 Id. at 447 & n.l.
2" 1 See id. at 447 n. •
202 See id.




297 Id. at 450 (quoting 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 128 (1963)).
208 Williams, 350 F.2d at 450.
896	 ROSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 38:861
fully consents to them, the court should not hold her to them if her
consent was a result of a gross disparity in bargaining power:
Ordinarily, one who signs an agreement without full knowl-
edge of its terms might be held to assume the risk that he has
entered a one-sided bargain. But when a party of little bar-
gaining power, and hence little real choice, signs a commer-
cially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its
terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or even an objective
manifestation of his consent, was ever given to all the terms.
In such a case the usual rule that the terms of the agreement
are not to be questioned should be abandoned and the court
should consider whether the terms of the contract are so
unfair that enforcement should be withheld."
In effect, the court said that where the terms of an agreement are
so grossly unfair that a party with the true power of choice would
never consent to them, it can be assumed that the plaintiff's consent
was the direct result of her subordinate position. 21 °
Rather than questioning whether Williams acted reasonably in
agreeing to the terms of the agreement, the court directed its attention
to the behavior of the store to determine if the store's conduct was
improper in light of the disparity in bargaining power. If the court had
instead asked whether a reasonable person would have signed such a
contract, or even whether a reasonable woman would have, the case
probably would have come out differently. Economic duress aside, a
reasonable person presumably would not have entered into a contract
with such oppressive terms. Although Williams might not fit the defini-
tion of a "reasonable" woman, she should still prevail because Walker-
Thomas took advantage of her economic vulnerability. The Williams
decision illustrates how applying the unconscionability standard in-
stead of the reasonableness standards can result in a more just outcome
in contracts cases.
Under the unconscionability framework, the problem of essential-
ism is more manageable. In Williams, the court did not focus on the
gender or race of the plaintiff. In fact, the race of the victim is unclear
from the opinion. Rather, under the circumstances of that case, it was
the economic status of the plaintiff which created the power imbal-
ance. If given a true choice, Williams probably would not have agreed
to such unfair terms. But presumably, given her economic situation
2(41 1d. at 499-50 (citations omitted).
210 Id.
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and her likelihood of defaulting, most stores would be reluctant to sell
her a stereo on credit, and of course she would not be able to afford
to pay for the stereo outright. Her only choice, if she wanted a stereo,
was to agree to oppressive terms.
b. Unconscionability Theory Applied to Landlord Sexual Harassment
Williams' dilemma was not unlike the situation encountered by
many low-income tenants who are faced with landlord sexual harass-
ment. Had Williams been on equal footing with Walker-Thomas, the
court probably would not have interfered with the contract. The same
analysis could be applied in rental sexual harassment cases. Consider
again the scenario involving Sharon and Susan. 2 " Under the reason-
ableness standards, neither Sharon nor Susan is likely to prevail. Phone
calls and off-color personal remarks, while potentially annoying if
unsolicited, can be and have been viewed as harmless. 2 ' 2 After all, the
landlord never touched the tenant or asked her for sex. 213
 Notably, the
outcome in both cases is likely to be the same because it is based on
whether an objective person would have found that the conduct
(which is the same in both cases) created a hostile environtnent, 2 ' 4
What makes the environment hostile, however, is the context.
Sharon, because her landlord has more power over her, is more vul-
nerable to economic intimidation than Susan. Sharon feels she has no
choice but to indulge her landlord so as not to be evicted. Thus, to
her, the same environment might be hostile. 215 In effect, Sharon is
forced to live in conditions she, and probably others in her position,
would find hostile, because she is unable to simply move to a new
apartment. The result is acceptance of a form of abuse that a "reason-
able" woman would find tolerable or merely annoying. Sharon is less
likely to suffer the same consequences under a power-related analysis
because she would be more likely to prevail on a hostile environment
claim.
211
 See supra text accompanying note 111.
212 See, e.g., supra note 41.
213 This hypothetical example is not meant to address what type of conduct should constitute
sexual harassment. It is meant only to show the potential difference between the reasonableness
standards and the unconscionability standard.
214 Although the reasonableness standards call for an evaluation of conduct "under the
circumstances," a review of hostile environment cases reveals no evidence that courts consider
factors such as race or class in the determination.
215 It is not my intention here to emphasize the likelihood that a court would consider the
landlord's conduct to be sexual harassment. I mean only to note that the two situations should
be analyzed separately based on the individual relationships at hand.
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It does not follow from the above example that it would be impos-
sible for a landlord to sexually harass a white, middle-class tenant. In
fact, there are two different analyses which could lead to a conclusion
that Susan was sexually harassed. As in unconscionability law, the analy-
sis should include a balancing of procedural and substantive defects. 216
That is, the greater the power imbalance (analogous to a procedural
defect), the less offensive the conduct need be (analogous to a sub-
stantive defect) . 217
 The worse the conduct, the less conspicuous the
power imbalance need be. I analogize the power relationship in
Susan's situation to contracts cases involving adhesion contracts. 218
There is always some power differential between parties who enter into
contracts of adhesion. One party has drafted the contract and is famil-
iar with all the terms and the other party is presented with a "take it
or leave it" situation—she must either accept the contract as it is, or
not enter into the deal."' Despite the power imbalance, adhesion
contracts are enforceable and are in fact used often in every day
sales. 22° Because of the power imbalance, however, adhesion contracts
are presumptively suspect. 2" Evidence of additional bargaining defects
such as fine print and convoluted terms is likely to result in an unen-
forceable bargain (at least theoretically). 222
216 See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
217
 Note that although the inquiries in sexual harassment law and unconscionability law are
analogous, they are not perfectly parallel: the "substantive defect" in sexual harassment is not an
actual defect in the contract, but rather unfairness in the landlord's behavior toward the tenant.
In quid pro quo cases, a more exact parallel can be drawn to unconscionability law. If quid
pro quo is analyzed as effecting a modification of the lease, where sexual favors become required
terms of the lease, then any imbalance of power between the landlord and the tenant constitutes
a "procedural" defect, and the amended onerous terms of the lease constitute a "substantive"
defect.
219 "Adhesion contract" means a standardized contract drafted by a party with superior
bargaining power and imposed directly upon the other party on a take it or leave it basis. See
Neal v. State Farm Ins. Co., 10 Cal. Rptr. 781, 784 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961). See generally FARNSWORTH,
supra note 169, § 4.26.
219 See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
CoLum. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943).
22" Kronman, supra note 184, at 771 ("Many contracts are contracts of adhesion in the general
sense that one party is able to dictate terms to the other, but this alone does not make an
agreement objectionable.").
221 In
 recent years, for example, courts and legislatures have intervened in the exchange
process by implying warranty terms that increase the consumer's rights under the contract and
even making the implied warranty non-disclaimable, in attempts to correct the imbalance of
bargaining of power that adhesion contracts typically involve. See generally Kessler, supra note 219,
at 633-36.
222 See, e.g., John Deere Leasing Co. v. Blubaugh, 636 F. Supp. 1569, 1574 (D. Kan. 1986)
(holding that an adhesion contract was unconscionable where "the term in question was in
minute print on the back of the lease, and was in such light grey type as to be illegible" and there
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In Susan's case, there is probably at least a slight power imbalance
based on the very nature of the landlord-tenant and gender relation-
ships. 223 Susan's case also involves some "inappropriate" conduct. The
power imbalance and improper behavior together, like with many
adhesion contracts, might not be sufficient to warrant court interven-
tion. If the conduct were worse, or additional evidence were presented
showing a greater power imbalance, however, a finding of sexual har-
assment would be justified. In Sharon's case, because of the significant
disparity in power, the landlord's conduct need not rise to the same
level of egregiousness as in Susan's case to constitute sexual harass-
ment.
Alternatively, even if the landlord and Susan are on equal foot-
ing, if the landlord's conduct falls within the explicit category of pro-
hibited conduct,224 it will be considered per se harassment. Accordingly,
whether certain behavior will be considered harassment toward both
Sharon and Susan, depends on the conduct and not on the parties. The
"power" inquiry is only called into play when the conduct does not
constitute per se harassment. Both Sharon and Susan are protected
against what in recent history has been viewed by a majority of courts
as sexual harassment. My standard provides additional protection to
Sharon against conduct which is harassment only because of her lack
of choices or the imbalance of power.
Several of the housing sexual harassment cases might have been
decided differently under my proposed standard. Many courts, apply-
ing the reasonable person standard, found some of the "milder" con-
duct discussed above to be acceptable, either because the landlord did
not touch a tenant's intimate body part or because the harassment only
occurred once. For example, in DiCenso v. Cisneros, the court conceded
that the landlord "may have harassed" the plaintiff. 225 The defendant
"vaguely invited Brown to exchange sex for rent" and caressed her arm
and back while asking about the rent. He also called her names such
was a disparity in the bargaining power between the parties); Colonial Leasing Co. of N. Eng.,
Inc. v. Best, 552 F. Supp. 605, 607 (D. Or. 1982) (holding that the forum selection clause was
unconscionable where it was contained in a form contract, in fine print, at the bottom of the
page, and was not understood by the unsophisticated defendant when he signed the lease); In
re Hamby, 19 B.R. 776, 779, 781 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982) (holding that the waiver clause was
unconscionable where it was contained within 73 lines of small print on the back of adhesion
contract).
223
 It is conceivable that in a different time, with a different housing market, a tenant might
have some power over her landlord. In most urban settings today, however, landlords generally
have at least some power over their tenants. See supra notes 122-39 and accompanying text.
224  See supra notes 175-82 and accompanying text.
2 2 5 9 6 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Gin 1996).
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as "bitch" and "whore."226
 The court concluded, however, that although
the landlord's conduct was "clearly unwelcome," it did not constitute
sexual harassment because he did not "touch an intimate body part"
or "threaten [her] with any physical harm" and there was only one
isolated incident. 227
Likewise, in Honce v. Vigil, the landlord invited his tenant to
accompany him socially on three occasions and persistently asked her
when they could "go out," among other things. 228 The court found that
the conduct was not sufficient to constitute a hostile living environ-
ment because it was not sexual in nature. 2
 In Honce and DiCenso, the
landlords most likely had substantial economic power over their ten-
ants. Applying my proposed test, if evidence were presented indicating
a significant imbalance of power between the parties, both cases might
have been decided differently.
More compelling examples of "harassing" conduct which went
unpunished can be found in hostile work environment cases. In Saxton
v. AT & T, for example, the defendant on one occasion put his hand
on the plaintiff's leg and kissed her until she pushed him away. 2" Three
weeks later, the defendant lurched at the plaintiff from behind some
bushes and unsuccessfully tried to grab her." Although there was more
than one incident, the court held that the incidents, though "subjec-
tively unpleasant," were not frequent or severe enough to create a
hostile environment. 232
 Under a power-based analysis, the challenged
behavior would be considered sexual harassment because the actor was
a supervisor with significant power over his employee.
The court's first inquiry, then, should be whether the landlord's
conduct is per se violative of the Act. If not, the court must assess what
type of power the landlord has over the tenant, based on any unequal
social conditions and seemingly inherent and unalterable character-
istics that affect the tenant's relationship with the landlord. The court
must then determine whether the alleged harasser improperly took
226 See id. at 1006.
227 1d. at 1008-09.
228
 1 F.3d 1085, 1087 (10th Cir. 1993).
229
 Id. at 1090.
2 :10 10 F.3d 526, 528 (7th Cir. 1993).
231 See id.
232 Id. at 535; see also Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 990 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1993). In
Weiss, the defendant asked the plaintiff for dates on repeated occasions, placed signs which read
"I love you" in her work area and twice attempted to kiss her. 990 F.2d at 337. Again, the court
held that these incidents were too isolated and insufficiently severe to create a hostile work
environment. Id.
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advantage of that imbalance of power.'" As in unconscionability law,
this determination should be made on a case-by-case basis.'"
V. CONCLUSION
Contemporary society is characterized by systematic and signifi-
cant inequalities between individuals. Identities are hierarchized in
relationships of domination and submission. " [P] art of the definition
of class identity involves contrasting oneself with other social classes." 235
Sexual harassment is in part a reaction to this socioeconomic structure
that empowers one individual or group at the expense of another.
Power hierarchies are especially visible in landlord sexual harass-
ment cases. Landlords often have power over their tenants by virtue of
their property ownership and because of serious housing shortages.
Additionally, minority women, who comprise a majority of tenants
victimized by sexual harassment, can be further subordinated by social-
ized norms. Focusing on whether the power is specifically gender-based
or race-based, however, simply sidetracks the analysis. Courts must look
at each individual situation to assess the power hierarchy and then
must evaluate the defendant's conduct in light of any imbalance of
power.
I am not proposing a standard in which no categories or gener-
alizations exist at all. Rather, the standard should be based on multiple
consciousness. 2" As Angela Harris suggests, "we [should] make our
categories explicitly tentative, relational, and unstable;" 237 to account
for "a world in which people are not oppressed only or primarily on
233 This theory may have implications well beyond the housing context. For example, it could
be applied in the employment context as well. Application of this theory to other areas of the
law, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
234 See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
233 Ehrenreich, supra note 15, at 1224.
236 See Harris, supra note 112, at 584-86. Harris uses "multiple consciousness" to identify all
the voices of the speaker. Harris writes:
[W]e are not born with a "self'," but rather are composed of a welter of partial,
sometimes contradictory, or even antithetical "selves." A unified identity, if such can
ever exist, is a product of will, not a common destiny or natural birthright. Thus,
consciousness is "never fixed, never attained once and for all"; it is not a final
outcome or a biological given, but a process, a constant contradictory state of
becoming, in which both social institutions and individual wills are deeply impli-
cated. A multiple consciousness is home both to the first and the second voices,
and all the voices in between.
Id. at 584 (quoting Teresa de Lauretis, Feminist Studies/Critical Studies: Issues, Thrrns, and Contexts,
in FEMINIST STUDIES/CRITICAL STUDIES 1, 8 (T. de Lauretis ed., 1986)). See generally discussion
supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
287 Harris, supra note 112, at 586.
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the basis of gender, but on the bases of race, class, sexual orientation,
and other categories in inextricable webs." 2" Because factors such as
gender and race historically and statistically contribute to power im-
balances, those factors may be relevant to the analysis. But courts must
only draw on those factors in order to understand the power matrix.
The factors cannot be used as a presumptive basis for determinations.
Until courts recognize power differences as the root of sexual harass-
ment, housing sexual harassment jurisprudence will remain caught in
a truly unreasonable conundrum.
"8 Id. at 587.
